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Rule_404.Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character 
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under 
Rule 404(a(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused 
offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution 
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the 
first aggressor; 
3 
.6 
..6 
...9 
10 
19 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, 
as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon 
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the 
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if it's probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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State v. Baker 963 P.2d 801 (Utah App. 1998) 10 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and 
Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The City of Orem prosecuted the defendant for a charge 
of theft (shoplifting). The City introduced 'prior bad act' evidence 
asserting the defendant had previously committed a theft five to six 
months previous. See City's 404 (b) Motion. The Court without 
hearing or without analysis allowed such evidence. Transcript Page 9 
Line 12. 
Did the Court improperly admit Rule 404 (b) evidence into 
evidence? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant was charged an accusation of theft on April 28, 
2006. Trial set for October 4, 2006. The matter was tried before a 
jury. The defendant was found guilty. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
On September 28, 2006, six days prior to trial, the City filed a 
'Motion in Limine' seeking permission to introduce evidence that the 
6 
defendant had stolen a pair of shoes from the same store five to six 
months earlier. 
This 'prior bad act' evidence is based on an allegation that in 
November or December, 2005, the defendant entered the Mr. Max 
store and took a pair of shoes (size 10.5) that were on display. The 
evidence was based on the store manager's (Mr. Hayden) suspicion 
that the shoes were stolen. Page 17 Line 5-12. Page 79 Line 24-25 
The Court suggested that it was more than an allegation since the 
defendant nor his wife bought the shoes. Page 17 Line 14-16. 
On April 28, 2006, the defendant entered the same store and 
tried to exchange a pair of shoes. The store refused to exchange 
the shoes without a receipt. 
On April 28, 2006, defendant was reportedly observed taking a 
bottle of cologne from the store and leaving without paying. Upon 
being confronted out of the store, the defendant advised that he had 
been distracted due to his mother's illness. He reported that he had 
been up for nights on end tending to his mother's medical needs. He 
advised that he had mistakenly failed to pay. 
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The City sought to introduce the 'prior bad act' evidence to 
counter defendant's claim of mistake or inadvertence. 
Immediately prior to commencing the trial, the City provided to 
the defense an audit which had been completed the day prior to trial 
by the purported victim. Page 9 Line 14-17. Page 12 Line 10. Page 
13 Line 24-25. Defense counsel objected arguing that he was now 
required to defend not only the current allegation but now an 
allegation reportedly occurring the prior year. Page 10 Line 8-10. 
The Court then ruled the City could use the 'prior bad act' 
evidence for identification purposes. Page 11 Line 20. Defense 
counsel then stipulated to identity. Page 11 Line 21. 
The Court then found the City could use it to two fold: 
1. The taking of the cologne was not a mistake, and 
2. The evidence could be used to prove 'opportunity'. Page 11 
Line 25. Page 12 Line 3-6. 
Pursuant to this ruling, at the close of the defendant's case, the 
prosecution re-called the store manager (Hayden) to testify that in 
November or December, 2005, Mr. Winterose came into the store 
and walked hurriedly out of the store in a strange fashion. Page 71 
Line 7-10. Hayden then check for his shoe inventory and noted a 
10.5 size shoe was missing. Page 71 Line 14. The witness then 
went on to describe how Mr. Winterose left the store quickly. Page 
72 Line 14-17. The witness advised that he did not know that the 
defendant stole the shoes but that he merely saw Mr. Winterose in-
store and later noticed a pair of shoes missing. He assumed the 
defendant had taken the shoes. Page 79 Line 24-25. 
The prosecution then asked for the witness' impression 
whether he believed Mr. Winterose had stolen the shoes. Page 81 
Line 22-23. Over objection, the Court allowed such testimony. Page 
82 Line 3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to conduct a Rule 404 (b) analysis 
including consideration of whether such evidence met the 
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evidence admissible for identity, mistake and opportunity. 
The Court allowed the store manager to improperly offer 
his opinion, as evidence, that Mr. Winterose had stolen the shoes. 
Evidence of a prior theft allegation should not be admitted 
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Winterose was a thief was improperly admitted. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
'Prior bad act' evidence may not be admitted to establish the 
defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. Rule 404(b), 
Utah r\uies> ...... -.. oaker9bJ V A\ Mill (Ul.ih App 
1998) II liny "lily .irHii'ss, IIPII ' har;H,.,i iss'ir"\ -v- innliv-', 
opportunity, intent, preparation ' , or knowleda° Rule 404(b), 
Uta Kules of Evidence identity, _. jbsence of n accident 
In State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 Ut 59, 6 P 3d ^ ~ 0 , the 
Court found held if such evidence is to be admitted for proper non-
chara- jence, I inusl (.nii'lih I ,i lliu'u priit 
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analysis' to determine admissibility. The 'three-part analysis' must 
consider the prohibitions of Rule 402, Rule 403 and Rule 404 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. See also State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 
348, 57P.3d1139 
In State v. Nelson-Waggoner, the defendant was charged 
with five counts of rape with five different victims. On defendant's 
motion, the trial court ordered separate trials on each count. 
However, upon the State's request, the trial court allowed the other 
rapes to be admitted as evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 
404(b). The State sought to introduce evidence of other accusers to 
testify to the similar circumstances of their alleged rapes in order to 
establish defendant's modus operandi, motive, preparation, intent, 
knowledge, and lack of mistake or accident, as well as to show lack 
of consent. The trial court agreed that the circumstances of 
defendant's other alleged rapes were similar enough to "constitute a 
signature," a proper, non-character purpose under Rule 404(b). The 
Court also found that if the evidence met the requirements of Rule 
11 
,)T Kules 402 
and 403 (Utah Rules nt I wiripnrp). 
The Court concluded to determine admissibility 
must first determine whether the bad acts evidence is being offered 
for a proper, non-character purpose, such as one of those specifically 
listed ' ). 
They cited Sk*,-.,- . . where 
the court held that th- -• 
and the same victim did not form a common Qc S 
operandi because "the similarities are common to many assault and 
rape cases and are not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's conduct." 
See also Stale v. Featherson, (m H.2d 424, 429 (Utah 1989). 
(• u;'("iouii liiiinii iii.il Mil«i'\/iiii'in e was \wA being offered 
for 'identity' purposes. However 
Court then found that it was offered to prove the absence oi 11. 
The Court also indicated that it may be introduce as evidence of 
'opportunity'. Opportunity was not pursued by the City. 
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IDENTITY 
In State v. Webster. 2000 UT App 238, 32 P.3d 976, this 
Court overturned a theft conviction where the trial court admitted 
evidence suggesting the defendant had previously stolen a car from 
a Virginia dealership. The State argued that the evidence should be 
admitted for the purpose of establishing identity. This Court found 
that the act of theft in Virginia did not bears either numerous or 
signature-like similarities to the crime charged in Utah. The only 
similarities apparent between the two incidents was that (1) a car 
was stolen and (2) from a dealership lot. The separate acts were not 
unique as to constitute a signature offense peculiar only to the 
defendant. . 
The Court noted: 
.. .the State has fallen into the common error of 
equating acts and circumstances which are merely 
similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or 
plan.'" State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d424, 429 (Utah 
1989). 
In State v. Cox , 787 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1990) the State 
attempted to introduce two other reported rapes on separate women 
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in a rape trial. The Court could not conclude that the actions of 
defendant constitute a common design or modus operandi. The 
Court found the similarities argued by the State were common to 
many assault or rape cases and is not peculiarly distinctive of 
defendant's conduct. 
Here, no unique or 'signature conduct' is being offered by the 
City. The only basis argued is to challenge Mr. Winterose's defense 
of 'mistake or inadvertence' is that he had stole before. 
The Webster Court found evidence of Webster's auto theft in 
Virginia, at some unidentified time in the past was not probative of 
the fact that he had the intent on July 10, 1998, to steal a car in Utah. 
The Webster Court also mandated that the trial court must 
conduct a scrupulous examination in the proper exercise of the 
Court's discretion. See also State v. Decorso, 1999 Ut 57, 993 P.2d 
837 (2000). 
RULE 402 
If the court finds that the evidence is for proper non-character 
purposes, it must then proceed with the additional analysis under 
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Rule 402. Rule 402 permits admission of only relevant evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 402; 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines relevant 
evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." 
In State v. Decorso. 993 P.2d 837, 843 (Utah 1999) the court 
reasoned that this type of evidence was inadmissible, stating that 
other crimes evidence must have" 'a special relevance to a 
controverted issue and [must be] introduced for a purpose other than 
to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.'" State v. 
Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988). 
The Court should look to two factors: 1) similarities between 
the crimes" and 2) and "the interval of time that has elapsed between 
the crimes." See State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295-96 
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If the Court finds that there is some relevancy, the Court then 
must consider whether such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial 
effects under a Rule 403 analysis — whether the probative value of 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
RULE 403 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
This rule was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 845 (Utah 1999), where the court stated that 
"in deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like 
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of 
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence 
as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the 
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degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility." 
STRENGTH OF EVIDENCE 
In State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91 (Utah 1982), 649 P.2d 91, the 
Supreme Court found the predecessor to Rules of Evidence 404 
(Rules 46 and 47 of Utah Rules of Evidence) did not permit evidence 
of specific acts of violence, short of criminal conviction, to prove the 
deceased's violent character. 
The holding of the Webster Court also suggested that the 
quality of 'prior bad act' evidence was lacking. 
Here, the prior bad act allegation was not based on a 
conviction. The accusation here did not have the probative value of 
an arrest or criminal charge. It was based on the suspicions of the 
store manager that Mr. Winterose had stolen shoes reportedly 
missing five to six months previous. 
Here, there was no showing that a similar methodology and 
plan or for any non-character issue. In State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 
(Utah App. 1990), the Court found the admission of two prior rape 
allegations by different women although may have been relevant, it 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." jd. at 6. 
Furthermore, the Cox court found that the early rape allegation by the 
same victim one month prior to the charged offense was 
inadmissible, stating that "[although the prior act of nonconsensual 
intercourse with the victim is less remote than the other two prior 
acts, it is still unfairly prejudicial because it has no direct bearing on 
defendant's intent on the date of the alleged rape." Id. at 7. (See 
State v. Saltareili, 655 P.2d 697, 700 (Wash. 1982), where the court 
denied prior evidence of an attempted rape committed four and one-
half years prior to the present offense, reasoning that "it is by no 
means clear how an assault on a woman could be a motive or 
inducement for defendant's rape of a different woman almost five 
years later," criticizing the use of "motive and intent as 'magic 
passwords whose mere incantation will open wide the courtroom 
doors to whatever evidence may be offered in their names,'" citing 
United State v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141. 1155 (5th Cir. 1974.) 
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Finally, Defendant argues that admission of this evidence 
would result in "confusion of the issues". As noted by defense 
counsel at trial, the defendant was not required to defend the theft 
accusation on two separate occasions instead of dealing with a 
single accusation. 
CONCLUSION 
The admission of 'prior bad act' evidence is presumptively 
inadmissible. Certain exceptions exist, however, including 
opportunity, identity, or absence of mistake. The identity of the 
defendant was not an issue nor was the question of whether he had 
the opportunity to commit a crime. The only viable alternative is the 
'absence of mistake'. . 
Here, the Court did not conduct a three-part analysis as 
required. The only finding made was the evidence could be admitted 
to prove identity, opportunity, and the absence of mistake. The Court 
admitted the evidence without any analysis under Rule 402 or Rule 
403. 
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To support this alleged prior bad act, the trial court allowed the 
City's witness express his suspicion and personal belief that the 
defendant had stolen the shoes. 
If the evidence would have been analyze under a Rule 403 
analysis, the Court should have found that the prior theft evidence is 
extremely prejudicial. This is especially of concern when the current 
allegation is theft. 
The evidence was used to demonstrate the defendant had the 
propensity to steal. The City's position was that the defendant's 
propensity invalidated his assertion of being sleep-deprived, stressed 
and distracted by his mother's long term illness. This evidence was 
not credible since once a thief always a thief. 
Defendant's conviction should be overturned based on the 
admission of improper character evidence. 
DATED this 12th day of April, 2007. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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